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wealth, set by higher emancipation. Having reached a high level of democracy and emancipation, societies tend towards
equilibrium that does not support further economic growth. Our findings give strong empirical evidence against a popular
political science theory, known as the Human Development Sequence. Contrary to this theory, we find that implementation
of human-rights and democratisation precede increases in emancipative values.
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Introduction
Despite cultural, political and economic differences across
different countries, more and more countries are moving toward
more democratic regimes, with higher levels of civil liberties [1,2].
At the same time rising levels of education and standards of living
in many parts of the world have given more and more people
higher existential security [3]. Parallel to these phenomena, the
World Values Survey has found that cultures and therefore
cultural values are changing too [4].
What is the relation between these various phenomena that
have transformed various societies? In the 1950s, Lipset [5]
provided empirical evidence for a positive relation between
socioeconomic development and political democratisation. Later
studies mostly confirmed this positive correlation [6–10]. Recently,
we re-explored the relation between democratisation and
economic development, accounting for possible non-linearities
[11]. We found that democracy does not not grow linearly with
GDP per capita, instead we see rapid and sudden democratisation
once GDP per capita has surpassed a certain threshold. If GDP
per capita is below this threshold, economic growth will not cause
democratisation. On the contrary, countries starting with a certain
level of democracy experience democratic decline.
While our earlier work identified a threshold effect, it does not
reveal the roots of the relation between democracy and economic
development. And in fact, GDP is often considered as inappro-
priate to measure the overall economic development level of a
country [12–15]. Moreover, democracy and GDP are just two of a
large number of factors – including education health and cultural
values – involved in the process of development. It is known that
together these and other socio-economic factors provide favour-
able conditions for democratisation [5–7], but it remains unclear
what the relation between them and democratic change precisely
is [5,8,16]. There exists also an alternative measure for nations’
socio-economic development, HDI (Human Development Index).
The HDI is a combined metric of education, wealth and life
expectancy [17,18] and therefore gives a fuller picture of
development than GDP per capita alone. Our aim in this paper
is to re-examine the black box relationship between democracy,
socio-economic development and cultural change [5–10,19].
It is possible now to attain this objective because of the recent
availability of cross-national time-series data on indicators
measuring socio-economic, political and cultural development.
Table 1 lists a set of ten socio-economic, democratic and cultural
value indicators that we use in this paper. These indicators are
available for many of the world’s countries over the last 30 years.
For socio-economic progress we primarily use HDI and respective
indicators included in HDI [17,18]. We also use measure of both
human-rights and effective democracy [20–22] and cultural
changes measured in the World Values Survey [20,23]. Using
such a varied selection of longitudinal data will allows us to identify
interactions between the indicators which capture the overall
pattern of development. The data set is described in full in the next
section.
We are not the first researchers to attempt to identify between-
country similarities in human development. Indeed, the approach
dates back to modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s [5,24–
26]. Currently, one prominent modernization theory is the
Human Development Sequence. It proposes that cultural values
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mediate the effect that economic development has on democra-
tisation [20,27–29]. The sequence describes a linear relation
where economic progress enables change of cultural values which
ultimately leads to democratisation. Economic development
provides the opportunities and means for a self-expressive and
emancipated life and the desire to shape one’s own life provides a
motivation to change the rules by which people are governed,
therefore demanding more democracy [20,28–30]. This theory
has been disputed [19,31–33], and it remains an open question to
what extent it can explain commonalities in the development of
very different countries.
More recently, Abdollahian et. al. [34] took a more systematic
approach to the available data. They wrote down differential
equations for changes in GDP, self-expressive values and
democracy, based on the assumptions of the Human Development
Sequence. They show that the model parameters fit the available
time series data. However, these authors do not test alternative
models. It is always possible to find the parameter set for a given
model that best fits the data, but the important question is whether
there are other plausible models that perform even better. Here we
properly account for this limitation. We do not start with a strict
hypothesis about the underlying patterns in human development,
but rather identify the best models that fit the available data. We
adopt the novel Bayesian dynamical systems approach detailed in
Ranganathan et al. [11], but in the current paper account for all
relevant and available indicators of human development.
We proceed as follows. We first describe the ‘‘Data’’ we use in
more detail. Then in the ‘‘Results’’ we present the best fit models
of the complex dynamic interactions between the Human
Development Index (HDI), cultural values and human-rights
democracy. In section, ‘‘Role of the HDI components’’ we look at
the role of the components of HDI in relation to democracy and
cultural values. In section ‘‘Testing the Human Development
Sequence’’, we test the Human Development Sequence theory
assumptions and show that it is not particularly well supported by
the available data. We finally discuss our overall results and
suggest an alternative model of human development based on our
analysis. In the ‘‘Material and Methods’’ section at the end we
describe in more detail the methodological approach we used in
our analysis. A comprehensive supplementary material includes
further details of the data and additional results used to support the
main conclusions.
Data
We used ten different indicators in our analysis: six socio-
economic indicators, two democracy indicators and two cultural
values indicators (see Table 1). The main socioeconomic indicator,
HDI (Human Development Index), is a composite index that
combines measures for education, life expectancy and Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita [17,18]. Additional analyses
were carried out on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and
female education. GDP per capita was used to test the Human
Development Sequence. Female education (mean years of girls’
schooling) was included in the analysis because it is an indicator
that education is equally open and accessible to all parts of the
population. Moreover female education measures gender equality.
To operationalise democracy we used two measures: 1) The
human-rights weighted democracy index consists of civil liberties,
political and human rights indices measured in the Freedom
House and Cingranelli & Richards Human Rights data project
[20]. It is our main democracy measure and and we will refer to it
as human-rights democracy. 2) The effective democracy index is
also based on Freedom House civil liberties and political rights
indices, but weighted by a rule of law index [21,22]. We used it to
test our results against earlier fitting of the HDS theory.
We measured cultural values with 1) the World Values Survey
emancipative values index, which is our main cultural values index
and with 2) self-expressive values [20,23]. Emancipative values
measure ‘‘decision-making freedom of the individual human being
and the equality of all human beings in this decision-making
freedom’’ [35]. Self-expressive values are to a great extent
equivalent to emancipative values, but encompass a larger variety
of different measures. For instance, the self-expressive index
includes prioritisation of environment protection, quality of life,
accomplishment and economic liberties, as well as measures of
social trust and respondent’s life satisfaction [23]. We use both
values in order to test result robustness and to reproduce earlier
tests of the HDS theory.
All indicator values, available from 65 countries for the time
period of 1981 to 2006, were scaled to provide indexes between 0
and 1 for better parametrisation (see Table 1). For more details of
the indicators used see Supporting Information section S12 in File
S1.
Results
In order to identify interactions between indicators without an a
priori picture of how these interactions should look, we adopt the
Bayesian dynamical systems approach described in Ranganathan
et al. [11]. We fit differential equations for the rate of change of
each indicator as a function of the level of the indicator itself and
the level(s) of other indicator(s) in the previous year. The function
is polynomial, consisting of polynomial terms that cover diverse
linearities and nonlinearities. These multiple linear and non-linear
terms and their combination give a large number of alternative
models. We calculate the Bayes factor to fairly compare models of
different complexity. Since we are considering ten indicators we
build our analysis up stepwise.
Democracy, HDI and Emancipative Values
The starting point is the relationship between HDI and human-
rights democracy. Figure 1(a) shows trajectories for six example
countries for the period 1981–2006. The figure suggests both,
interesting between country differences and some similarities in the
change of the trajectories over time. For example, despite
fluctuations there was an overall decline in democracy in India
between 1981 and 2006, while India’s HDI was increasing at the
same time. For South Africa, Albania and Chile we see a common
dynamic of rapid and radical democratisation irrespective of the
fluctuations preceding and following the democratisation wave.
Finally, Sweden and Italy also have similar trajectories: a minor
democratic decline followed by a recovery but an overall high
democratic level. All countries, with the exception of South Africa,
increased their HDI between 1981 and 2006.
To capture the general trend we used the entire dataset of 65
countries to calculate the best of all possible two variable models
relating current levels of human-rights democracy (D) and HDI
(H ) to the rate change in human-right democracy (dD=dt). The
best fit model model, i.e. that with the largest Bayes factor (see
‘‘Materials and Methods’’ for details on Bayes factor), is
dD
dt
~0:071H2{0:066D ð1Þ
This model indicates that human-rights democracy increases
non-linearly with HDI, but is self-limiting as democracy is not
The Dynamics of Democracy, Development and Cultural Values
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e97856
likely to grow once it reached a high level. Rather than simply
increasing as a function of HDI, human-rights democracy
increases only when Hw0:928
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
D
p
. This relationship captures
differences in how different countries have changed over the last
30 years, and is represented in the phase portrait in Figure 1.
The non-linear relationship between economic development
and democracy accounts for the difference in the development
trajectories of different countries. Human-rights democracy does
not always increase with growing HDI. Rather, a country must
first reach a threshold economic development before democratisa-
tion starts. If HDI is below that threshold, democracy will regress,
even if HDI itself is growing, as is seen for India. The non-linear
relation also captures the phenomena of sudden democratic
changes [36]. The level of democracy can remain low for a long
time, with some fluctuations but no real progress towards greater
democracy. However, once the threshold HDI is reached the
democratic changes occur rapidly and radically. This is exempli-
fied by Chile, South Africa and Albania, all of which experienced
rapid democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
We now turn our attention to a possible effect of cultural values
on democracy. The Human Development Sequence proposes that
democracy should increase as a function of emancipative values
(E) [27,28]. This assumption is supported by the data. Figure 2
shows both Log Likelihood and Bayes factor for all alternative
best-fit models of varying complexity (number of included
predictors and number of included polynomial terms) for dD as
a function of D itself, H and E. From this we can see that models
combining human-rights democracy, HDI and emancipative
values do not better predict changes in democracy than equation
1 with only H and D as predictors. From a large number of all
possible models including all three predictors, the overall best-fit
model, i.e.
dD
dt
~0:125H2{
0:005
HE
{0:094D2 ð2Þ
does have a Bayes factor roughly equal to that of equation 1. The
additional {
1
HE
term means that in two countries with identical
HDI, the country with lower emancipation will develop democ-
racy more slowly. The evidence for including the extra term is
however marginal, and HDI remains a much more important
predictor of democratic change than emancipative values. These
results were also robust to replacing emancipative values with self-
expression values (see section S1 and Figure S1 in File S1).
Model 1 implies that HDI has a non-linear effect on changes in
democracy, but does democracy have a positive effect on changes
in HDI? Factors predicting increases in HDI are notoriously
difficult to identify [10,37,38]. We also find that changes in HDI
are independent of levels of both human-rights democracy and
emancipative values (see section S2 and Figure S2 in File S1). The
highest Bayes factor model implies a constant rate of growth of
HDI with neither democracy nor emancipative values having a
significant effect on changes in HDI, i.e.
dH
dt
~0:0045 ð3Þ
Our analysis thus far suggests that cultural change is not a
decisive predictor of democratic change or socio-economic
development. But how is cultural change affected by political
and socio-economic change? We found that emancipation
increases as a function of both economic development and
human-rights democracy. Specifically, emancipative values in-
crease in proportion to their product, and the model.
dE
dt
~0:006HD ð4Þ
has the highest Bayes factor (see section S3 and Figure S3 in File
S1). Emancipative values are adopted most rapidly by major parts
of the population when both economic development and human-
rights democracy are well established.
The system of equations 1, 3 and 4 provide a description of the
most probable dynamic of development across countries for the
last 30 years. Equation 3 shows that HDI appears to evolve
independently. Equations 1 and 4 show that HDI then drives both
Figure 1. Phase portrait of changes in human-rights democracy values (x-axis) against changes in HDI (y-axis). The coloured lines give
temporal changes in representative countries, starting from the solid dot for 1981. In (a) data is used to draw the trajectories. In (b) best-fit models are
used to predict the changes given initial values in 1981. The arrows represent a vector field showing changes according to the best fit models for
human-rights democracy (equation 1) and HDI (equation 3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097856.g001
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the emergence of human-rights democracy and of emancipative
values. Human-rights democracy also contributes to an increasing
emancipation (equation 4). These results are robust, in the sense
that when we look at the highest Bayes factor models with one
more or one less term than in equations 1 to 4 they do not
radically change the interpretation of the model. For example,
including a third emancipative values term in equation 1 reveals a
rather weak effect from emancipative values on human-rights
democracy.
Repeating the above analyses with the effective democracy
measure, rather than human-rights democracy, we see that the
former measure does not have the same effect on emancipative
values. The best predictor of changes in E in this case is HDI
alone. This would suggest that the crucial component of
democracy for emancipative values to spread in a population
appears to be human rights. Otherwise, the results for changes in
HDI and changes in effective democracy are largely consistent
with those we found using human-rights democracy index (see
section S4 and Figure S4 in File S1).
Role of the HDI Components
We have identified relationships between growth of human-
rights democracy and levels of HDI, but HDI itself is a complex
measure and encompasses various phenomena. To open up the
HDI black box, we looked at how changes in human-rights
democracy are predicted by its components: life expectancy (L),
UN education index (I ) and log GNI per capita (G).
We found that education and GNI are better predictors for
changes in human-rights democracy than life expectancy (see
section S5 and Figure S5 in File S1). The model which combines
positive effects of education and GNI per capita on human-rights
democracy has the highest Bayes factor for predicting human-
rights democratic change:
dD
dt
~0:11D IG{1:08Dð Þz0:025G2 ð5Þ
Education is often identified as a mediator in the positive
relation between socio-economic development and democracy
[7,9,39,40]. In this model education interacts with GNI per capita,
Figure 2. Log Likelihood and Log Bayes factor for models of change in democracy as a function of the variables and the number of
terms allowed in the model:
dD
dt
~f (D,H ,E). Number of terms refers to the terms in the polynomial f (D,H,E). See ‘‘Material and Methods’’
section for details on the fitting method. DE-models are of a form f (D,E), i.e. terms containing human-rights democracy and emancipative values as
predictors, DH-models use human-rights democracy and HDI as predictors in f (D,H) and DHE-Models models use all three variables as predictors.
The two best-fit models (marked in red) refer to equations 1 and 2. The two-term DHE-model (marked in black) is identical to the best-fit two-term
DH-model, equation 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097856.g002
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an indicator for the standard of living of people of a given country
and it is this product that contributes to democratisation.
The lack of predictability of HDI in equation 3 is also somewhat
unsatisfactory. It is surprising that democratisation and cultural
values appear to have no impact on socio-economic development.
It is often argued that socio-economic development actually
benefits from democratic conditions [41,42]. Breaking HDI in to
its components explains why we obtained equation 3: emancipa-
tive values have opposite effects on the different components.
Specifically, life expectancy is predicted to increase in societies
with high levels of emancipative values, with the model
dL
dt
~0:028E 1{
0:887
L
 
z
0:004
L
ð6Þ
providing the highest Bayes factor. On the other hand, growth of
GNI per capita is slowed down by emancipative values, and the
most probable model is
dG
dt
~0:002
G
E
ð7Þ
This negative effect of emancipative values on GNI per capita
neutralises the positive effect on life expectancy, and thus explains
why no overall effect is measurable from emancipative values on
HDI (see section S6 and Figure S6 in File S1).
Finally, education, the third HDI component, is best predicted
by a constant growth rate (see section S6 and Figure S6 in File S1)
with neither emancipative values nor democracy being decisive for
predicting growing levels of education in a population, i.e.
dI
dt
~0:007 ð8Þ
However, if we replace the education measure with an index for
female education, emancipative values do predict increases in
female education, F , and the model
dF
dt
~0:007
E
F
ð9Þ
has the highest Bayes factor of those models involving E and F (see
section S7 and Figure S7 in File S1). Female education may be
seen as a measure of equal access to education and gender
equality. In itself, female education is as good predictor for
human-rights democracy as the overall education index. The
model with the highest Bayes factor, i.e.
dD
dt
~0:11D GF{1:07Dð Þz0:03G2 ð10Þ
combines a positive effect of female education and GNI per capita
on democracy. Comparing this model with equation 5 suggests
that female education and general education are equivalent with
respect to their effect on human-rights democracy (see section S8
and Figure S8 in File S1).
In the previous section, we showed that HDI and human-rights
democracy both predict increases in emancipative values (equation
4). The question now is which HDI components are most
important for emancipative values to spread in a population? We
looked at the role of the three components of HDI in predicting
changes in emancipative values (see section S9 and Figure S9 in
File S1 and see section S10 and Figure S10 in File S1 for female
education effects) and found that life expectancy and human-rights
democracy constitute the best predictors for rising emancipative
values, i.e.
dE
dt
~0:028D L{0:585Dð Þ ð11Þ
has the highest Bayes factor (see section S11 and Figure S11 in File
S1). This would suggest that life-expectancy provides a more
natural measure of overcoming existential concerns – a precon-
dition for emancipation according to the HDS theory – than, for
example, GNI.
Testing the Human Development Sequence
Our analysis so far has already challenged several assumptions
of the Human Development Sequence (HDS) theory. To quantify
the difference in fit between our model and HDS theory we
compare the fit of our models to the fit of differential equations
models proposed by Abdollahian et al. [34]. These authors used
GDP per capita (G), self-expressive values (S) and democracy (D)
[34] as indicators. They proposed the following models:
dG
dt
~l1(1{G)zl2D ð12Þ
dS
dt
~b1GS(1{S) ð13Þ
dD
dt
~ c1S(S{D)zc2Dð Þ(1{D) ð14Þ
Estimating the model parameters using a least-squares methods
they concluded that overall the models fit the data quite well. They
found that economic growth was poorly predicted by democracy
(l2 was not significantly different from zero). Therefore, they
revised their original model and removed D as predictor. They
also found that c2 showed a negative sign, indicating that
democracy is not self-reinforcing. But they did find evidence for
l1, b1w0 and c1w0 as predicted by HDS.
The above models (equations 12 to 14) are just one subset of the
models tested in our analysis, where we look at all polynomial
combinations of G, S and D and others as predictors of change.
Figure 3 shows the Bayes factors for models suggested by [34] in
comparison to the best fit models when allowing for all polynomial
terms. With our approach, the models with the highest Bayes
factor are
dG
dt
~
0:055
S
ð15Þ
dS
dt
~0:02D ð16Þ
The Dynamics of Democracy, Development and Cultural Values
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dD
dt
~0:08G3z1:90D{0:85
D
G
{0:96DG{0:14D2 ð17Þ
These models outperform HDS-based models to a very
significant degree, with not only the best model having a higher
Bayes factor, but a whole range of other models outperforming
equations 12 to 14. In particular, the equation 13 for changes in
self-expression is very poorly captured by HDS theory in
comparison to a simple linear growth relation to democracy.
The equations for GDP and democracy also differ substantially
from the predictions of HDS. Equation 15 confirms our earlier
result that economic growth is slowed with emerging self-
expressive values. Human-rights democracy itself is predicted in
equation 17 to change as a function of GDP per capita, rather
than by self-expressive values. Equation 17 is rather complicated,
and it is worth noting that the second best model is the simpler
Figure 3. Comparing HDS and data-derived models for GDP per capita (G), human-rights democracy (D) and self-expressive values
(S). (a) G(HDS)-Models are the two models suggested by Abdollahian et al. (2012) [34] to model changes in GDP per capita (equations 12 and the
same equation without D as predictor) based on HDS theory. GD-, GS- and GSD-Models are models for changes in G with either D, S or both
predictors, derived from the data. The Best-fit Model refers to equation 15. (b) S(HDS)-Model is the model suggested by Abdollahian et al. (2012) [34]
to model changes in self-expressive values (equation 13) as predicted by the HDS theory. SD-, SG, and SDG-Models are models for changes in S with
either D, G or both predictors, derived from the data. The Best-fit Model represents equation 16. (c) D(HDS)-Model is the model suggested by
Abdollahian et al. (2012) [34] to model changes in democracy according to the HDS theory (equation 14). DG-, DS- and DGS-Models are models for
changes in D with either G, S or both predictors, derived from the data. And the Best-fit Model here is shown in equation 17.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097856.g003
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relation
dD
dt
~0:11G3{0:07
D
G
ð18Þ
which is again similar to our earlier findings for HDI (equation 1).
Both equations 17 and 18 show that GDP per capita has a positive
but non-linear effect on democracy, while democracy’s growth is
mostly limited by high levels of democracy itself. Although having
slightly different functional forms, these equations produce similar
relationships between socio-economics, cultural values and
democracy as we saw in previous sections. The results in the
previous section were not dependent on the particular variables
chosen, but are robust to changes in the measurements used.
Discussion
Given the complexity of interactions involved in human
development, we cannot expect one mathematical model to
account for all the variability in this process. We have however
identified a small set of equations that fit the changes in economic,
social, political and value indicators over the past 30 years (see
Table 2). The implications of these equations are summarized in
Figure 4. They do not correspond to a linear sequence, but instead
a set of dynamic thresholds, feedbacks, accelerating and deceler-
ating as well as limiting effects. We now discuss in more detail the
important steps in this cycle.
Starting with democracy, we find that improved education and
a certain standard of living as expressed in GNI per capita lead to
an improved political climate (equation 5). One micro-level
explanation for this relationship is that education makes people
more critical and autonomous and educated people are likely to
demand political changes once they have reached a certain
standard of living and financial security that relieves them from
daily existential worries and allows for long-term planning of
society. This hypothesis is supported by Mani et al. [43], who
found in lab and field experiments that cognitive performance is
reduced in individuals experiencing severe financial concerns. This
effect prevails when controlling for people’s intelligence, education
and various other factors. Severe financial concerns made it
difficult for people to think clearly and to plan the long term. Both
our macro-level patterns and their micro-level experiments suggest
that poverty itself inhibits democratisation, without the need for a
mediating factor.
For cultural values, we found that emancipative values increase
with existential security, with life expectancy playing the most
important role. Equation 11 and our robustness tests with effective
democracy index suggest that existential security seems to go
beyond life expectancy, and include security granted by human
rights. On the other hand, and contrary to earlier suggestions
[20,23], GNI or GDP per capita did not directly lead to an
increase in emancipation. Economic development alone is not
sufficient to free people from existential concerns and some level of
human rights and therefore of democratisation is also required.
Socio-economic development is affected by cultural values
(equation 7). Earlier studies on cultural values’ effect on economic
growth have come to different, sometimes contradictory conclu-
sions [44–47]. We find that emancipative values are associated
with a slowing of economic growth, possibly as a result of a change
of emphasis from materialistic to post-materialistic goals. On the
other hand, countries with higher emancipative values exhibit
increases in life expectancy and female education (equations 6 and
9 respectively). As such, while emancipative values may foster
equal access to education, gender equality and a healthy life they
do not lead to further accumulation of wealth.
In summary, we show that a critical level of Human
Development Index triggers democratisation and then the
emancipation of the population. We find that, human-rights
based democratisation precedes increases in emancipative values,
rather than the other way around. Moreover, once countries reach
high levels of democracy and emancipation, they tend towards
equilibrium in terms of economic growth. Higher emancipation
appears to limit further growth of wealth.
The results we have presented are the best fit models to the
available data. We assumed no a-priori pattern in human
development, and by using a Bayesian approach identified genuine
statistically significant relationships within the data. There are
several reasons to believe that the relationships we have identified
are robust. Firstly, the use of Bayes factor ensures that we do not
specify overly complex models. Secondly, by looking at alternative
indicators and including different numbers of terms we ensure that
the results are not sensitive to measurement changes. Finally, by
including a full range of non-linear terms, we capture the complex
interactions inherent in the data.
Table 2. Set of equations describing relations in Figure 4.
Equation Relation
dD
dt
~0:071H2{0:066D
HDI ? Democracy
dD
dt
~0:11D IG{1:08Dð Þz0:025G2
dE
dt
~0:028D L{0:585Dð Þ Democracy ? Emancipative Values
Life expectancy ? Emancipative Values
dL
dt
~0:028 E{
0:887
L
 
z
0:004
L
Emancipative Values ? Life expectancy
dG
dt
~0:002
G
E
Emancipative Values ? GNI per capita
dF
dt
~0:007
E
F
Emancipative Values ? Female education
dD
dt
~0:11D GF{1:07Dð Þz0:03G2 Female education ? Democracy
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097856.t002
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Our approach contrasts strongly with that taken in specifying
the Human Development Sequence (HDS), where the overall
hypothesis was first postulated and then ‘tested’ against data. This
testing involves comparing the predictions of the theory against a
null hypothesis in which there is no detectable pattern in the data
[20]. Such an approach fails to account for the vast space of
possible models about human development. The fact that one
model provides some predictive power hides the fact that there
may exist multiple other theories and models that provide just as
good or even better predictions. Our approach simultaneously
tests all models and reveals those which fit the data most robustly.
We find that some predictions from the Human Development
Sequence theory are supported, but other central predictions are
not. The most notable inconsistency between data and HDS
theory is seen in emancipative values, which only poorly predict
democratic change. On the other hand, the assumption that
emancipative values increase with existential security is justified,
but should be measured in terms of life expectancy and human
rights, and not GNI or GDP per capita.
One of the problems with describing and predicting the
evolution of human social systems is that many written alternative
explanations of social change appear to ’make sense’ in terms of
our own experience and the rational motives of agents [20]. One
could argue that we have simply provided one more sensible story
of this type. However, the story we provide here accounts for the
inherent non-linearities in human development and is shown to be
the best fit to the best available macro-level data. Moreover, the
directional links in the cycle shown in Figure 4 are consistent with
micro-level analyses of the World Value Survey data. Emancipa-
tive values in individuals are higher for those living in the more
democratic countries [20], those with the higher household
incomes [20] and those with the higher formal education [20].
Individuals with higher formal education tend to support
democratic institutions and democratic norms [49–53]. Ideally,
we would like to see how these micro-level variables change within
the same individual over time. For example, to determine the
relative importance of income and human rights experienced by
an individual on their degree of emancipation, we would need data
on how they and their children changed in these factors over a 20
or 30 year period. At present this type of panel data does not exist.
The fact that we have been able to carry out the current analysis
relies firstly on the new methodological approach we have
developed [11]. Secondly, it is possible because of the fact a
comprehensive time series data for indicators has recently become
available (Table 1). As more data becomes available, for instance
data on the current economic crisis or on ecological factors, the
best fit model may change, and our interpretation of the data
should also change. This pragmatic point is essential. It places an
emphasis on exploratory methods for finding the best interpreta-
tion of the available data [54–56], rather than providing a
justification of an already existing verbal or theoretical argument.
As society becomes more data rich, these methods are going to
play an increasing role in how we interpret the past, predict the
future and develop theories.
Materials and Methods
We adopted a novel data-driven mathematical modelling
approach to analyse dynamic relationships in the yearly changes
of above mentioned indicators. The methodological approach is
explained in detail in our recent paper [11]. Our basic approach to
understanding interactions between indicators is to model changes
in one variable between times t and tz1 as a function of all
included model variables at time t. We fit ordinary differential
equations to country-level data on indicators, that consist on the
right-hand side of polynomial terms to capture various linear and
non-linear effects. In a two variable model case we fit a model to
describe the average yearly changes in x as a function of both x
and y,
dx
dt
~f (x,y) ð19Þ
For example, consider indicator variables for HDI (H ) and
democracy (D). We would seek a best-fit model for changes in
democracy dD as a function of H and D and in order to test a
Figure 4. Human development model based on the equations (see Table 2) found in our analysis. The feedbacks positive (+) or negative
(2) indicate the sign of terms in the models selected on the basis of the Bayes factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097856.g004
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wide range of possible interactions, we fit models of the form:
f (dD)~a0z
a1
H
z
a2
D
za3Hza4Dz
a5
HD
z
a6D
H
z
a7H
D
za8HDza9H
2za10D
2z
a11
H2
z
a12
D2
Where the values ai are coefficients to be fitted from the data in a
multivariate regression. These terms do not provide an exhaustive
set of all possibilities, but allow enough flexibility to capture
possible non-linearities in the system. Still, sometimes it might be
necessary to include cubic terms (e.g. in equation 6 and 7) to
capture multistage dynamics for instance (see also [11]).
There are 13 possible models with one term and, in general
13
m
 
possible models with m terms. We fit all
13
m
 
possible
models with m terms, restricting m to be up to six, computing the
Log Likelihood L(m) for each model using Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regression. This provides the Maximum-Likelihood esti-
mate of the parameter values (assuming iid Gaussian residuals). In
the first stage of our fitting process, we aim to rapidly narrow our
search by finding the Maximum-Likelihood model (equivalently
the model that minimises the sum of squared errors with the
observed data) for each possible number of terms, m.
The models preselected on the basis of maximum log likelihood
are then fitted again using a Bayesian model selection approach
[57–61]. Specifically, we calculate the Bayesian marginal likeli-
hood, which we call ‘‘Bayes factor’’ B(m), which expresses the
probability of the data conditioned only on the model, without
selection of a specific set of parameter values. Calculating the
Bayes factor is the likelihood averaged over the parameter space
with a prior distribution defined by p(wm).
B(m)~
ð
wm
P(dxDx,y,m,wm)p(wm)dwm ð20Þ
The Bayes factor compensates automatically for the increase in
the dimensions of the model search space, as the prior probability
on any particular choice of parameters is reduced in proportion to
the number of possible parameter values [60]. We choose a non-
informative prior distribution [62]. For example, p(wm) can be
chosen to be uniform over a range of possible parameter values.
This range of values is chosen to include all feasible values but to
be small enough for the integral to be computed using Monte
Carlo methods.
The key idea in our approach to modeling additional indicators
is to look at how model fit improves as we add further indicators.
Model complexity depends now both on the number of terms and
the number of variables. For three variable models we would like
to determine whether or not we require all of these variables to
model their rates of change. To do this, we calculate Bayes factor
for models including all three indicators and compare them to
those including just pairs of indicators.
In a three variable model case we fit a model to the average
yearly changes in x as:
dx
dt
~f (x,y,z) ð21Þ
In making a fitting, we first assume that the yearly changes are
polynomial functions of x, y and z, using a restricted range of
polynomial terms as in the two-variable fitting. The model for
change in x may be expressed now by any combination of the
following 33 polynomial terms, for example with the three
indicators HDI (H ), democracy (D) and emancipative values (E):
f (H,D,E)~a0z
a1
H
z
a2
D
z
a3
E
za4Hza5Dza6Ez
a7
HD
z
a8
DE
z
z
a9
HE
za10HDza11DEza12HEz
a13H
D
z
a14D
H
z
a15H
E
z
z
a16E
H
z
a17D
E
z
a18E
D
z
a19H
DE
z
a20D
HE
z
a21E
HD
z
a22HD
E
z
z
a23DE
H
z
a24HE
D
za25HDEz
a26
HDE
za27H
2z
a28
H2
z
za29D
2z
a30
D2
za31E
2z
a32
E2
For three indicators we have now
33
m
 
possible models with
m terms. We generally restrict our analysis to those with up to
m~5 terms because of the rapidly increasing number of possible
models with m. By plotting B(m) for three variable models as a
function of m and comparing this to B(m) for two variable models
we can assess the utility of adding a third explanatory variable to
the model. Further details of methodology are given in [11].
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